WASHINGTON DC - United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken is going to have “some very difficult conversations” in Ankara over the Syrian National Army (SNA) attacks on the areas under the control of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria (Rojava), a former US State Department official told Rudaw on Wednesday. Blinken is expected to be in Ankara on Friday and meet with senior Turkish officials, including his counterpart Hakan Fidan to discuss the developments in Syria and situation in Rojava. “I expect that there are going to be some very difficult conversations about what the Syrian National Army, with the support of Turkiye is doing in northern Syria at the moment, the images that we have seen treatment of civilians, as well as the attempt to use this opening to seize control of SDF held areas, I think is destabilizing at best,’’ Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Jennifer Gavito said.. “I am realistic about what the Turkish position has been to date, and nonetheless, I’m hopeful that when Turkiye looks at the big picture and sees an opportunity for stability to include a government, an inclusive government,” she added. Gavito discussed a wide range of issues related to Syria and Syrian transition government-led by US designated terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, (HTS). She believes that the US has offered a window into an opportunity for a new way forward for HTS in Syria. “Opening the door to removal of the terror designation in order to ensure that support can be given to a transitional government with HTS as an important player in that, I think, is one of those areas where the international community can be supportive,’’ Gavito said. The following is the interview of Gavito with Rudaw: Rudaw: Thank you so much. Jennifer Jennifer Gavito: Thanks for having me this morning. You have followed the recent developments in Syria? Very closely. I've been following Syria for 20 years, and this has been a stunning turn of events. Was it surprising to you? Absolutely, obviously, the war had been going on for 13 years, but for all intents and purposes, it's been a frozen conflict for the last several years, and so that the opposition forces would make a move, particularly with Russia and with Iran, both less focused, perhaps on on Syria than they have been in the past, in light of the events in Ukraine, in Israel, etc, and was maybe not surprising. But the speed with which the opposition moved, I thought, was, was shocking. You have just departed from the State Department. It's been a year and a month. So, if you look into the statements that are coming out from the regional leaders in Iraq and in Middle East, even if you look at the statements that made by Abu Muhammad jolani, they're saying or indicating that there was a plan ahead of this. And what is appeared and being said that even the US was aware of this. Do you think that the US was aware of such a plan that Muhammad jolani and HTS is going to destroy Bashar Assad's regime in just few days? I think the key words there are in a few days. I think certainly the State Department and US government, generally speaking, would be well aware of the aspirations of HTS to eventually regroup and and bring down the Assad regime, but within a few days, it's hard for me to imagine that that very many people expected this to unfold as it as it did, especially because Russia and Iran, both in their own ways, have viewed Syria as such an important element of their regional and in the case of Russia, even global strategy. You have covered Iraq for a long time, and you were the state department, you visited Iraq, you know, every element in Iraq. So, there are some groups, especially the Shiite groups, in Iraq which they are saying that there were a joint operation room led by UK, US and Israel to do this in Syria. To what extent do you think this is true? I would defer to my former colleagues at the Department of State for any details on what kind of coordination was happening as a government. We certainly as diplomats, you know our job was to talk to all elements of society and so certainly, our personnel would have been trying to get information over the course of the last many years, and stayed in close contact with all of these groups to understand what their intentions were. But as far as some bigger conspiracy to take down Assad in this manner, in this moment, I am deeply skeptical of those claims. Do you think, it's not true? I think it's probably not true. The US was not recognizing Assad regime, but at the same time, if you look, they were and have designated HTS as a terrorist group, even there's a bounty about 10 million dollars to the head of [Mohammed] Golani. So do you think there's a new window in the US that they are looking into the Syria even they are about to accept Golani and his government, because what we hear from President Biden, and what we have from the State Department during the last few days, what they say, they say that we are looking at their actions, right? So is that meaning that the US is open to work with them? Absolutely, I mean, I think you know to take a step back, the very fundamental reality of this week is the world is a better place if Assad is not in charge of Syria the United States position, as you note for years, has been that he could not be a legitimate leader of the Syrians, particularly having used chemical weapons on his own population. And so Syria today is fundamentally better because Assad is not there. Do you think it's better? We don't have Assad, but we have some groups. They were linked to ISIS, they were linked to al Qaeda. They were, they were… So, I just, I want to, I want to lay down that. I think, you know, first and foremost this week, we have to recognize that it is a positive thing that Assad is no longer torturing, tormenting his people. But you are absolutely correct. HTS is designated as a specially designated terror organization by the United States government, by the United Nations and by many of our partners around the world. This is a challenge. You know what we've heard out of the President and out of the Secretary of State, though certainly offer a window into an opportunity for a new way forward for HTS and for Syria writ large, the Secretary of State yesterday laid out a variety of conditions that were necessary in order for the United States and presumably our partners and allies to recognize the new government in Syria. And those include, those include the transfer of humanitarian assistance, inclusivity, I am not recalling all four of them, but yes, an opportunity to review this… But there is another thing here, as we think about the opportunity. What do you say for this, if you assess someone, if you don't have any anything about their background, about their history? You say, okay, okay, we are looking into your future, but if you know the person in the past, you assess them based on what they did in the past. So, does the US happy with what HTS did when they had a government in Idlib and elsewhere in Syria? So that has been an evolution. No. I mean, the short answer is there are deep concerns about Jolani and the past activities of HTS. The reality of where we are today, though, suggests that their actions moving forward to include some of the really important statements that they've made over the past days, certainly weeks, months, talking about inclusivity, protection of religious minorities, you know it, an issue that is of such importance, as we know throughout the region. And so those concerns over Jolani are not going to go away, but I do think it is important, not just for the United States, but for all of Syria's friends, regional partners, to allow for an opportunity for a new type of government to emerge that respects human rights, that respects religious minorities. And so if Jolani and the HTS can facilitate that transition and be part of a new Syria, then I think they will find a willing partner at the end of the day in the United States. Actually, there's a lot of questions about the HTS and Golani , but we know that in Syria, we don't have only HTS. We have other groups like Syrian National Army. We have SDF democratic forces backed by US, So today Secretary Blinken is visiting the region, he's going to Turkiye and he's going to Jordan. Okay, so what do you expect from his visit to Turkiye? I expect that there are going to be some very difficult conversations about what the Syrian National Army, with the support of Turkiye is doing in northern Syria at the moment, the images that we have seen treatment of civilians, as well as the attempt to use this opening to seize control of SDF held areas, I think is destabilizing at best, and undermines what we were just talking about. The potential for a new, more positive, inclusive Syrian government, the The US engagement with Turkiye and with SDF, to bringing these two groups, the Turkiye as a country and SDF as an autonomous administration, North East Syria, is not new which they have tried this for a long time, so and the Turkiye has showed their non acceptance to any initiative with SDF. Do you think this time, as we have a new phase in Syria, the US can persuade Turkiye to get together with SDF, at least, to have some sorts of ceasefire and not attacking the civilian facilities, and let the SDF do what they are doing with the US in fighting against ISIS Yes, and that, first of all, I was remiss in mentioning that. You know, when we talk about what US interest is in Syria, and what the conditions have to be.. So what is the US interest? The US interest is very much protection of those troops that are the 900 or so American troops that are currently operating in northeast Syria in coordination with our partners in the SDF in order to fight ISIS. What about your partners? Are you interested in protecting your partners as well? Absolutely yes. And I think that will be part of those very difficult conversations today in Turkiye. Do you see any hope in this conversations? I am realistic about what the Turkish position has been to date, and nonetheless, I am hopeful that when Turkiye looks at the big picture and sees an opportunity for stability to include a government, an inclusive government that brings together right now, you know, you previously had the Alawites, you had the regime, you had the Kurds, you had the SNA supported by Turkiye. You had all these disparate elements. Essentially, what it boils down to today are the Kurds in both of their forms, as well as the opposition forces, that's the control. And so if those two bodies can come together and create a transitional government that protects the rights of the Syrian people, and importantly. Is that doable with the current situation? I think it is as good of a window as we are ever going to have in Syria. There is good will on the part of the international community, but I don't want to leave Turkiye just yet. It is in Turkiye's interest to have stability in Syria. This is their moment to do that, but it does require compromise and finding a way forward between the SNA and the SDF in order to integrate into a transitional Syrian government that is in Turkiye's interest, and I suspect that that will be a basis for the conversations between Secretary Blinken and his counterparts in Ankara today. I am not sure if you agree with me that the Syrian question is not resolved with the collapse of Assad Regime. And there are a lot of analysis here in the US, and what I hear from the even the officials and the former officials and the people who are monitoring the situation, they say that the tough question starting now, because it was very hard before. They couldn't bring together all these elements before Assad, Regime collapse. Now, when you have one group, he is in an upper hand. When we have some other group, which they are in a weaker position. How could you have an have a new Syria with having all these groups in one government, and without being a threat to the regional partners, without being a threat on the US interests. How do you see the Syrian question from now on? So first, I think it would be wrong not to just acknowledge that this is an extraordinarily volatile and dangerous situation. It is, but it is where we are. And going back to the beginning, Syria without Assad is fundamentally better than a Syria with Assad, so it is extraordinarily dangerous and volatile That being said, if ever there were to be an opportunity for a single government that represents the Syrian people, this is that moment, that window will not last for long. You and I both know the region is in turmoil and a lot of other places too, but the eyes of the world are on Syria right now, and I think fundamentally the United States, European partners, the United Nations, have to first of all, respect that this is a Syrian led process, but at the same time, be able and willing to provide the tools needed in order for the Syrians themselves to stabilize this and that goes back at least in one way, to your previous question about what we do about HTS? Opening the door to removal of the terror designation in order to ensure that support can be given to a transitional government with HTS as an important player in that, I think, is one of those areas where the international community can be supportive, assuming, of course, that Jolani’s rhetoric and the rhetoric of HTS continue to focus on inclusivity and protection of all Syrians What about the accountability for the crimes they committed? That is, I think that is an open question. I think that's not something that is likely going to be dealt with in the short term. There are a lot of individuals and organizations in Syria that have committed unspeakable atrocities. That has to be part of a national reconciliation process down the road, but for the moment, I think focus has to be on stabilizing the political situation, ensuring a delivery are possible, and so, you know, really triaging what is happening there. But you asked if something along the lines of, you know whether, whether I think it's possible, and what has been most striking to two things have been most striking to me out of this week. First has been the rhetoric from all different groups, speaking about we are all Syrians, as you know, that has not necessarily been the case in the rest of the region. And so if the Syrians can hold on to this national identity and feeling of national responsibility for Syria's future, I think that is the fundamental building block for the way forward. The other thing that has given me a lot of hope this week and a lot of smiles, I worked in Europe during the Syria refugee crisis, and that the flows of refugees that you see returning to Syria, from Turkiye, from Jordan, potentially from Europe, really speaks volumes about how Syrians themselves feel about their country and the responsibility that they feel being part of rebuilding it and so again, if you can tap into that, it is not an easy road ahead, but I do really believe that there is, if the if the international community can play a supportive but not dominant role, I think that there is room for a better future. There's a room for a better future. And is there any possibility for a civil war? Of course, I think, I think that can't be ruled out. But I think again, that goes back to these difficult conversations, certainly with Turkiye, to with Israel to some degree, and what, what the international community and what Syria's neighbors need to be doing right now is everything they can to stabilize the situation, not destabilize it, and that isn't what we're seeing right at the moment. So, you brought Israel to our conversation. So, what we have heard from the Israeli leaders, we heard what Prime Minister Netanyahu said about the Kurds, about the Christians, and what we heard from the Israeli Foreign Minister, they are calling even they say that we're discussing with the US and friends to protect the Kurds in Manbij, which they couldn't and now in Kobani and in the areas under the control of SDF and autonomous administration. Is there any pressure from the Israel on the US government to help and to protect the Kurds in Syria? How do you see these statements from the Israeli officials? I think that it is in the US interest to protect certainly our partners in the SDF, and also to work with Turkiye to ensure that area does not further disintegrate into fighting, that's already in our interest. We don't, we don't necessarily need Israel to convince us that that's in our interest. But what happened when Israel, as your strongest ally in the region, is seeking a solution or seeing something that is in your interest and in their interest is that giving you more power to put more pressure on some countries in the region? I would caution Israel. If I were in these conversations, and I am not, I would caution Israel the same way that I would caution our own government, and that is that an extraordinarily light touch is needed at the moment, it was the Syrians who liberated Syria. It has to be the Syrians who devise the way to rebuild Syria. What our allies and partners, again, to include Israel and Turkiye, need to do is provide that space and not further destabilize the situation. So you know, talking about how we can go in there and force it, I think, is probably not the avenue that I would be recommending, So as you have worked on Iraq, why Iraq so much worried about the situation in Syria? What makes them so worried? And I was in a phone call with some officials, he said that even Iraq was about to get involved in Syria, but then the Biden administration advised them to stay away of it. Why Iraqi leaders, especially Shiite leaders are so worried about the current situation? Again, I think it goes back to this is volatile, and this is dangerous, and it also offers opportunity, but the volatility can easily spill over. We have seen over the course of the last decade that violence in Syria does is not contained within Syrian borders. It has been a playground for world powers, including Iran Iraqi militias and others, to launch destabilizing attacks throughout the region. And so I think that Iraqi leaders are right to be concerned that if an active conflict re erupts after a period of frozen conflict, that that will have a destabilizing effect on on Syria, or, excuse me, on Iraq itself. Then you add in, of course, the element in Iraq's Kurdistan region in particular, with the coordination with the SDF, and that just adds, I guess, another element of potential instability and conflict. You know, if Turkiye feels emboldened to continue to strike the SDF, we've seen them also striking inside of Iraq with some regularity. Again, that just adds fuel, fuel to the fire, as it were, and so I applaud the Iraqi government's decision to take a step back and not become involved. I think that we've seen that approach from most countries, perhaps most surprising to some degree, from Iran and and and Russia itself, it is to nobody's benefit for for what is happening in Syria to turn into another failed experiment. So speaking about the Kurds in Syria, do you think the United States is supporting the idea of recognizing the Kurds as a second nation in Syria in the future government, as they did in Iraq after 2003? It is hard for me to imagine that that is part of the discussion that's happening right now. Everything that I have seen and heard, including from the Syrian people, talks about a sovereign and single Syria, one country, that provides a home for a diverse community of ethnic, diverse ethnic communities that will be the focus. That will be the focus. I have a couple more minutes, so I will try to ask about the coming US administration, lately we saw President Elect Donald Trump statement on Syria, what he said was ths US has no interest in this conflict, and he is not very much agree with what this administration is doing in Syria. Do you think when the next administration is coming to the White House, they think to withdraw US forces in Syria as they think that they have destroyed ISIS? So the number of attacks from ISIS has gone up significantly in the last year, and so the landscape in the Middle East that a second Donald Trump administration is inherent, inheriting looks quite different from the first administration. I do think that there will be discussion about whether or not to withdraw those troops from Syria there was last time, and then ultimately it didn't happen. And so I think that this administration, and you know, a national security team that is experienced, will look at the relative risk of continuing to have a US presence there. And I should note, you know, this is reflective of the United States writ large, a population that increasingly does not support US involvement in overseas conflicts that it views as not its own. And we can debate what is our own conflict and what responsibility we bear, but that is just, you know, a voter that that reflects what what voter sentiment is, and so the Trump administration is reflecting that. But I think they'll take a look at this and look at ISIS capabilities. Look at the emerging situation in Syria, which, you know, one of the greatest dangers of all of this is again that you've got a power vacuum that ISIS can move into and use to again destabilize the region. So I think the team will look at all of that and make an assessment. If I had to give a guess. I think that those troops will stay in place, because ISIS has not yet been defeated. In fact, they are on the rise and have the potential to exploit the situation in Syria further to make additional gains. So I'm sure those conversations are happening. My best guess is that that that will not that will not be the final decision. You say that the second Trump administration will be different from the first one, what do you see in terms of Middle East policy? I mean, I guess what I'm saying is different, is the Middle East is different. There has been, you know, it has been a volatile few years in the region. And so the the Middle East that that they knew in 2016 looks quite different from the Middle East today. And so what I would expect from a Trump administration, I would expect very strong support for Israel, so continued support as needed, for bringing the conflicts in Gaza, less so Lebanon, now that a ceasefire is more or less holding in place in order to allow Israel to meet its objectives as communicated to the new administration, I think that will be a fundamental I think that you will see a very hard line towards Iran. Uh, they're certainly one of the areas that has changed over the last four years is the progression of Iran's nuclear program. You know, you can point back to the US withdrawal from JCPOA is an important, an important factor in that. But the reality is, today, their their nuclear program is far more advanced than it was a few years ago. So So I do think that there will be a very strong effort to stop that nuclear program. I think at the same time, though, part and parcel of the US being in a position to step back from the Middle East has to mean that there, you know, is some degree of stability and and the president fancies himself as a deal maker. And so even as you take a hard line towards Iran, I think it will be with an eye to figuring out how to come up with some sort of deal that stabilizes that relationship. Walks Iran back, not just from its nuclear program, but from its malign influence in the region, which has already been undermined as a result of actions against Hezbollah, now Syria, et cetera. So I think there's an important moment there. This will be my last question. I promise. So, what do you see about Iraq? When there's a hardliners or there's a lot of hawks about Iran. So, we know that Iran has upper hand in Iraq, especially with the current political parties, they are in charge. Do you think that the second Trump administration will put some pressure on Iraq, to cut the hands of Iran inside the country? Absolutely, and that will be a continuation of the Biden administration's policy as well. The United States has long been extraordinarily concerned about the influence that Iran has over Iraq, and I think that the Trump administration will share that concern and will seek to to find ways to end it. That being said, if I were, if I were advising the new administration, I would really go back to the concept that, you know, we, we've developed in the last couple of years, which is really helping Iraq orient into a moderate Arab state, and so strengthening its ties, whether energy or education or health care, with, you know, In particular, their Gulf neighbors, making it energy independent from Iran, so that it is not beholden to Iranian energy imports, which then, you know, Iran can use as a weapon, essentially, to influence the Iraqi government and then continuing to develop the relationship with Iraq in a way that promotes an Iraq that is at stable and at peace with itself, able to defend its own borders, has a productive and cooperative relationship with all parties, to include Northern Iraq and Kurdistan region. So I think you know, again, if you look at the strategy for what we what the end goal should be. I think a continuation of what we have tried to do in that regard over the last several years is going to be the best tool to meet what is sure to be the Trump administration's focus on diminishing Iranian influence. Thank you so much, Jennifer, thank you for your great insights on the region, and looking forward to have you on ruled out soon again. I look forward too, thank you so much
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