The political parties within the Coordination Framework were most relieved when Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced his bloc’s withdrawal from parliament, giving up his massive election victory which scored him 73 seats.
The framework lost no time to take full advantage and rallied political forces to hold an extraordinary session to have the resigned members of parliament replaced as soon as possible, which meant they became the largest bloc overnight. An extraordinary parliamentary session was held on June 23 with the framework striking a deal with the Sovereignty Alliance and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to ensure they attend and do not unite to form a blocking third in the future.
The details of the deal unravelled during the parliamentary session. The framework gave the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Halbousi assurances that they would not go after his post and also agreed to amend the parliament bylaws to abolish what is known as the "presidential commission" and replaced by “speaker and his deputies.” Halbousi was under pressure from his deputy Hakim al-Zamli who regarded himself as equal in authority with the speaker. In addition, the framework agreed with Halbousi that the Sunni share of ministries (six of them) in the next government would be given to the Sovereignty Alliance in coordination with the Azm Alliance led by Muthana al-Samarrai.
Similarly, the framework gave written assurances to the KDP in a statement read out by lawmaker Ahmed al-Assadi on behalf of the framework during the parliamentary session. It read that the political parties would "respect the constitutional principles and work to resolve differences between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the legislation of the oil and gas law."
However, the June 23 session aimed to ensure that the Sadrist movement would not return from their resignations, establish their replacements, and overcome the political stagnation by reaching an agreement with the Sovereignty Alliance and the KDP.
The agreement between the political actors is nothing more than ink on paper if practical steps do not accompany it. The most important step is perhaps exporting the Kurdistan Region’s oil and stopping Iraq’s ministry of oil from preventing this through legal prosecution, as well as an end to the framework’s targeting of the Sovereignty Alliance.
Contrasting visions and goals within the Coordination Framework
The balance of power within the framework changed after the withdrawal of the Sadrist movement. The Fatih Alliance, for example, has 35 deputies in addition to the independents, bringing their number to 44, while the State of Law bloc reached around 42 deputies, which means that the two blocs of Fatih and the State of Law are close in numbers. Thus, their rivalry will be highlighted during the negotiating marathon to form the government while the possibility of differences in vision among them exists.
Dealing with the Sadrists is an essential point of contention among the framework forces, dividing them into two camps. The first heralds the need to end Sadrist hegemony over the state apparatus by excluding them or limiting their political influence for the foreseeable future. In contrast, the other camp calls for maintaining balanced relations with the Sadrists considering their strong political presence and influence over the Iraqi street.
The same applies with regards to dealing with the Sovereignty Alliance. The first sign of the desire to dismantle the alliance was by allowing the Jamahir Alliance led by Ahmed al-Jubouri to withdraw. It is also arguably no longer a secret that some parties within the framework have wanted to oust Halbousi as they fear his grip over Sunni politics and his substantial expansion within the Sunni arena poses a future danger and contradicts their political aspirations.
Dealing with the KDP is a matter of great contention within the framework as some aspire to bring the party under their umbrella and away from the Sadrists. Others view the KDP as a threat given its strength and that it was a major player in the formation of the tripartite alliance.
The rocket attacks over the past week targeting the Khor Mor gas fields are clear evidence that some of the forces supporting the framework intend to provoke the KDP and the Kurdistan Region in general.
It is unclear at this time which of these trends will prevail within the Coordination Framework. Still, they present both the Sovereignty Alliance and the KDP with unpleasant options which could force them to rethink how to progress to the next phase, which is the government formation and electing a prime minister.
Leaders race for the position of prime minister
The Coordination Framework faces two significant challenges to complete the electoral process and move towards forming a government. The first challenge is to hold a session to elect the president, and the second is to choose a prime minister to lead the next government.
The framework's solution for the first challenge was to push the ball into the court of the Kurds, calling on the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to settle their dispute over the presidential candidate. However, both parties still adhere to their previous positions by pushing candidates for the position. Observers believe that the final solution is to return to what happened in 2018, letting parliament settle the race.
The second challenge is more complex, which could result in further delays in the formation of the government. Agreeing on the next prime minister and how to distribute ministries within the framework may also prove difficult as 12 out of 22 ministries are significant points of contention.
The frantic race for the position of prime minister started early and includes first-tier figures such as the leader of the State of Law Nouri al-Maliki, the head of the Fatih Alliance Hadi al-Amiri, and the head of the Victory Coalition Haider al-Abadi.
While the second-tier leadership line sees their chances as more significant than the first tier, the competition between them is at its most intense amid the launch of campaigns to target each other in various ways, including some common dirty tricks.
Leading the pack of candidates within the second tier is the current Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who launched his campaign by recalling his former team members. These three influential Shia players enabled him to achieve the consensus among the political blocs and obtain their approval to nominate him to the position in 2020.
Kadhimi also enjoys the support of the KDP and some Sunni leaders as well as support of regional states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran's non-objection to his return to power. Perhaps his official visit to Tehran on June 26 was a clear example of their support for him. However, he faces fierce opposition within the Coordination Framework, which cannot be underestimated, as they are the ones who make the ultimate decision.
Other candidates in the second tier are working quietly and without making noise. While they are waiting for opportunities, some enjoy a wide range of support. They have real chances to succeed in obtaining the nomination. Among them are Tariq Najm, Qassem al-Araji, Abdul-Hussein Abtan, Ali al-Shukry, Adnan al-Zarif, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, Asaad al-Eidani, and Qusay al-Suhail among others.
It is difficult to speculate on the one who has the highest chance at gaining the confidence and approval of the political forces amid their sharp and aggravating differences and intersections. However, the bar is very high; they need to obtain the approval of the political forces, as well as the acceptance of regional and international forces, in addition to the acceptance and satisfaction of Najaf and the Sadrists.
It is worth noting that the candidate to lead the next government will face significant challenges, including mass unemployment among the youth, high levels of poverty, the lack of basic services, climate crises, and water scarcity. Added to that, the issues surrounding the region's general security and the fact that the region is soon to be divided between two axes - the axis of normalization and the axis of resistance - Iraq may turn into a major battleground between these.
The withdrawal of the Sadrist movement has undoubtedly complicated the political scene, pushing Iraq on the brink of collapse. The political leaders in general and the leaders of the Coordination Framework, in particular, should not get caught up in their pursuit of their own whims and self-interests. They should think carefully about their next steps. They need to leave their past policies that were characterized by failure and disappointment behind. Maintaining these policies will lead the country towards inevitable collapse.
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraq Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and the former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
