Supporters of firebrand leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr stormed the Green Zone twice within under a week last month, staging a sit-in at the Iraqi parliament the second time they flocked into the area on July 30 marking the start of protests that could last for weeks or months ahead. The legislative chamber suspended its session until further notice.
Meanwhile Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhemi called on political parties to hold an emergency and inclusive meeting around an open dialogue table - a call welcomed by most of the political parties, except Sadr, who refused to engage in any dialogue with whom he referred to as "old and corrupt faces.” The Shiite leader called for early elections and the dissolution of the current parliament.
For its part, the Coordination Framework continued holding its regular meetings, which have reached 107 since it was incepted.
Dissolution of parliament and early elections
Sadr demanded the dissolution of the parliament and holding an early vote under the same electoral law that governed October’s elections. He also urged to maintain the current High Electoral Commission under the current government.
The Coordination Framework does not object to holding an early election on the condition that "a national consensus is achieved around the vote and a safe environment is provided to conduct the process,” in addition to the formation of a new government, amending the electoral law and assigning a new electoral commission.
The framework also does not believe that dissolving the parliament is the solution to end the political deadlock engulfing Iraq. Holding the majority in the current parliament, the framework will not go ahead with another early election before voting-in a new government and amending the electoral law.
On the other hand, the leader of the Sadrist Movement is demanding the removal of what he called the “old faces” of Shiite parties, meaning the Shiite political leaders who took over the country's affairs from 2003 to the present day, urging for their removal from the political arena.
The framework rejects Sadr's remarks, stressing that they are not ready to leave the political arena at the mere request of the leader of a political party. Instead, it sees the opposite, believing they represent parliamentary and constitutional legitimacy.
Sadrists face difficult choices
Among the most urgent questions that observers and Iraq watchers ask is: what is next?
The leader of the Sadrist Movement gradually raised the ceiling of his demands, but his latest move of urging his supporters to enter the parliament was a giant leap that might be difficult to repeat. With time, the ongoing demonstrations will lose momentum, and interests will loosen among the protestors and the media. In addition, disruptions caused by the protest to people's interests would stir public opinion away from Sadrists.
Maintaining momentum and keeping the protest alive would require the Sadrists to start escalations to keep the protests in the headlines. Such escalations could include taking over the Government Palace in the Green Zone, or the Presidential al-Salam Palace in Jadriya, or organizing a mass protest in southern governorates to paralyze the country's movement and force the political parties to meet its demands.
Without escalations, the Sadrist leader will have only two options. The first is to start a serious dialogue with the political class to reach some agreement in one way or another; some suggestions have been debated among the ruling elites. The second option is to end the demonstrations, pending the formation of a new government, which will turn into widespread opposition next year if the government fails to fulfill its duties.
The international community took a neutral position in regards of the recent political developments in Iraq and storming the legislature chamber. Observers described their position as "inadequate" to the size of the event, which was to stop the heart of the democratic process - parliament - from beating. This position contradicts their calls of democracy. Sadrists risk a change in the international community's position if they continue the disruption or threaten civil peace to destabilize Iraq.
The Coordination Framework dilemma
The Coordination Framework suffers from internal conflict and differences among its primary parties. It is a bureaucratic entity that finds it challenging to make rapid decisions that match the events on the ground.
It failed to seize the opportunity of the Sadrists withdrawal from Parliament - it took them 32 days to agree on a nominee for the post of prime minister, and they failed to agree on a nominee for the post of first deputy speaker of the legislature.
In addition, the framework also failed to reassure the Sovereignty Alliance and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Instead, they began to threaten Parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, saying they will remove him from his post – a move that made Halbousi boosts his efforts to join forces with the KDP and align once more with the Sadrists to prevent the framework from holding its parliamentary session to elect the president.
Observers believe that the Coordination Framework lacks initiative, and its work is based on reactions to what the Sadrist leader says or does. They failed to develop a solid plan to form the next government and gave Sadr plenty of time to re-group following his withdrawal from the parliament. That was a critical mistake that allowed the tripartite alliance to return to the political scene even when the Sadrists were outside the parliament.
Politicians respond to pressure
The ruling political class in Iraq used to work under the pressure of acute crises, and such pressures may be internal or external. For example, the threat of Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 united them, and they acted to confront it and later defeat it with the help of friends and allies.
In 2015, the government made a whole range of reforms under the pressure of protest and the entry of Sadr into the Green Zone at the time.
In October 2019 popular protest resulted in government resignation, and in 2021 the political parties held an early election. These are examples and evidence that political forces in Iraq resort to taking decisions under the influence of pressure, whether internal or external, regional or international.
Another factor would be economy. It is impossible to neither pass the budget law nor give the political parties access to public funds under a caretaker government. The funds allocated under the Food Emergency Law would be distributed in the next couple of months, and the political parties would need access to fresh funds. But with the parliament suspended, there is no way to have access to these funds, and for that purpose, the political parties might resort to ending the current stalemate to resume the work of parliament and elect a new government to share the financial spoils.
External factors could come from the international community, which has considerable interests in Iraq. They think the continuation of the political stalemate could be a factor in destabilizing Iraq and therefore threaten their interests. Conflicts in the region, Vienna talks between the US and Iran has a direct impact on Iraqi politics. They would contribute directly or indirectly to pushing the political elite to decide the political stalemate.
Sadr in his last three tweets classified the political positions in a religious way which could be regarded as further escalation and deepening the deadlock. In his latest tweet on Tuesday , he swears that he will not allow the "corrupt" to rule and "my type will not plead allegiance to the "corrupt," which is a reference to what Imam Hussein said about pleading allegiance to Yazid when he said, "my type will not plead allegiance to his type."
If the political parties fail to reach an agreement, escalation will occur – which could go as far as armed conflict among the various armed groups. The increasing level of rhetoric among the leaders makes escalation more likely unless or until there is some interference from outside or the marja of Najaf to stop it and bring parties back to the negotiating table.
Alternatively, the political parties could reach an agreement sooner or later due to internal or external factors; we might see an interim or transitional government, which will adopt a concise program and prepare for early elections.
It is also worth mentioning that any conflict between Shiite parties would lead the Kurds and Sunnis to seriously question their future. They will have to think about their people who expect services and security from them, which could be translated into moves to break away from Iraq and look for alternatives. Perhaps establishing a confederal Iraq becomes an option they opt to or a complete independence. In other words, we might see the Iraq that we have known for over a century disappear right in front of our eyes.
The Shiite leaders will face tough questions; do you want to divide Iraq because they cannot agree on quotas and positions? Is it not better for them and Iraq to agree on what is the best for the country and the people, rather than disagreements, conflict and struggle for the good of a small group that represents only themselves?
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraq Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and the former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
