It has become clear that the Sadrist Movement dominated the new Iraqi parliament's first session last week. Despite their main Shiite rivals, the Coordination Framework, attempting to block the session’s progress, the Sadrists forced the legislative body to adhere to the constitutional deadlines and vote in a speaker and two deputies during the first session. As a result, the Framework resorted to the Federal Court, claiming the session was not constitutional. The Federal Court issued an injunction on January 13, which temporarily suspended the authority of the speaker and his deputies from performing their duties until they ruled on the two cases submitted by the Coordination Framework.
The political situation is further complicated by the latest attacks on the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Taqadum Coalition and Azm Alliance in Baghdad, coupled with an attack on the house of a new parliament member for Taqadum.
Shiites reeling under division
The political situation in Baghdad has reached a deadlock because of the Sadrist Movement’s attempts at excluding some parties associated with the Framework. The remarkable electoral superiority achieved by the Sadrists in October’s early elections raised the fears of some leaders of the Shiite political house, as they believe that Muqtada al-Sadr may go towards targeting and excluding them when he controls the state institutions, especially the parliament, the government and security forces. Some believe that Sadr will work toward their political and economic dismantlement, and contribute to their waning influence. In addition, the Shiite house has become afraid of the dominance of the Kurds and Sunnis on the political scene. Some Shiite observers believe the tripartite alliance between Sadr, the KDP, and the Sunnis will make the Shiites a minority. The number of Kurdish and Sunni representatives - 93 seats - in the alliance outnumbers the Shiite representatives - 75 seats - which portends to a more significant danger if other blocs of the Kurds and Sunnis join this alliance when making important decisions. An example would be the first parliamentary session’s election of Mohammed al-Halbousi as speaker, who got a whopping 200 votes even though half of the Shiite members boycotted the voting.
Controversy over the largest bloc
The formation of the largest Shiite bloc faced difficulties due to the refusal of many new members to join. Emtidad Movement (9), Ishraqat Kanon (10), Tasmeem (5) and the independents within the Independent Iraq bloc (5), and 2 more independents from Najaf. In total, 31 members ruled themselves out of any largest bloc. It is worth noting that the total number of Shiite members in the Iraqi Parliament is 181.
During the first parliamentary session on January 9, the Coordination Framework submitted a list which they claimed 88 members of parliament signed. Some scrutiny of the list reveals that this number is not accurate. For example, they included Adel Hashush, minister of work and social security, who won the election but didn't take his oath to become a member of parliament. Despite the inclusion of the Iraqi Independent bloc as ten members, five of them stated that they never authorized anyone to sign on their behalf and will not be part of any bloc.
While the Sadrist Movement won 73 seats, they have been joined by a member from Diyala who was a Sadrist in the previous election, and a member from the party formed by Wasit Governor Mohammed al-Mayahi. We can therefore conclude that the Sadrists have 75 members.
As a result, the Coordination Framework cannot exceed 75 members, which is the same as the Sadrists.
However, the Sadrists have a trump card under their sleeves. According to informed sources, they submitted two lists that claim to be the largest bloc. The first one is named Homeland Reform (Eslah Watan), including Shiite-only members. The second is named Homeland Rescue (Enqath Watan), which includes the Sadrists, the KDP, and the Sunnis and it exceeds 162 members.
It is worth mentioning that the Shiite psyche is paranoid of this move by Sadr. They believe that this would be the beginning the end of their grip on power.
The controversy over who will form the largest bloc has not ended. This same argument could intensify again in the near future and when the Parliament resumes its work after the Federal Court decides on the cases brought before it.
The Kurdish and Sunni houses
The Sunnis are the biggest winners of the political negotiations after the elections. They have managed to unite under one alliance (Al-Azm and Taqadum Alliance), nominate one member for the Speaker of Parliament, and win with an overwhelming majority. They have also become an influential factor, maybe even kingmakers, inside the Shiite and Kurdish blocs by siding with the candidates for the post of president and prime minister.
On the other hand, the Kurdish house suffered more cracks after the KDP allied with the Sadrists without its leading partner in the region, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). They did this even though they formed a joint delegation with the PUK to visit Baghdad a couple of days before the parliamentary session of January 9. In addition, the KDP nominated a candidate for the post of president, a post that the PUK has held since 2006.
The KDP has multi-level targets that it wants to achieve. They want to impose a new reality in Kurdistan politics: they believe that they represent the majority of Kurdish voters. They no longer need to divide the posts with their long-term partner, the PUK. They further believe that the Strategic alliance signed by the PUK leader, the late Jalal Talabani, and KDP leader, Masoud Barzani, is no longer valid.
The KDP set the ambition of achieving a "comfortable majority" in Kurdistan in 2011 during its 13th party conference. The KDP leadership believes that the time has come to implement this principle after the cracks that afflicted its partner, the PUK. As a result, the KDP is nominating a prominent member of its leadership, Hoshyar Zebari, instead of the PUK candidate, the current President, Barham Salih. Furthermore, the KDP could be reflecting this policy during the upcoming elections in the Kurdistan Region and the formation of the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
In recent years, the divisions in the ranks of Kurds in Baghdad made them lose their influence significantly. During the government formation process in 2014 and 2018, the Kurdish members were not even present in the parliament hall when the voting on ministers started. The three ministries that were allocated for the Kurds remained vacant for months. They also lost many high posts in the federal government, such as the governor of Kirkuk, the chief of staff of the army, the deputy chief of the intelligence service, the commander of the air forces, the Chairman of the Independent Election Commission, and a large number of deputy ministers, ambassadors, director general, and more.
The Kurds before 2014 were kingmakers and the most dominant players in Baghdad politics. Now that they have lost their unity, they are weaker than ever.
Next steps
The Federal Court has issued its injunction to suspend the results of the first parliamentary session temporarily until the cases brought before it regarding the constitutionality of the procedures for electing the Speaker of Parliament and his deputies. Many legal experts believe that the court will dismiss these cases. However, some believe that the court may rule the session unconstitutional, which would mean a return to square one and repeat of the first session, with Mahmoud al-Mashhadani sitting on the acting speaker as the eldest MP. Such a ruling would greatly complicate the political scene.
Without a doubt, the court’s injunction has made way for further political negotiations and bought the parties more time for dialogue that might lead to solutions that ease tensions between opposing parties. However, the gap between these parties is still significant, and there are no signs of an agreement on the horizon, despite the second visit by the leader of Fatih Coalition, Hadi al-Amiri to Sadr on January 15.
Should the Federal Court decide on the speaker’s election was constitutional, the countdown to electing the President of the Republic will begin, and the competition between the PUK and the KDP will intensify. Controversy will also escalate within the Sunni and Shiite components regarding support of the candidates. It is expected that the elected President of the Republic, upon his election, will designate the person nominated to form the next government. And this means that the election of the President is not a purely a Kurdish affair; his election means all political components will be affected and hence working on influencing its outcome.
Iraq’s political scene remains complicated until the largest bloc in parliament is decided upon. Each of these cases has positive and negative aspects because it directly affects selecting and naming the next prime minister.
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
