As a Kurdish woman with family roots extending deep into the soil of Kirkuk, I care deeply about the security, stability, and future prosperity of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq. As a former parliamentarian, I also care deeply about the integrity and power of the political process, and am conscious of the vital role it plays in reflecting and preserving societal values and cultural identity, as well as codifying equitable rights and protections for all citizens. The proposed amendment to the Personal Status Law is a threat to both.
From the outset, the proposed amendment has been met with local and international outcry. Serious concerns have been raised about the amendment’s potential to undermine the constitutional rights of women and children, exacerbate violence and discrimination against them, weaken family systems, deepen sectarian divisions, enervate trust in the state, and compromise the independence and impartiality of public institutions. These concerns have been voiced by a broad cross-section of Iraqi society that includes parliamentarians, academics and religious scholars, activists, and civil society organizations. Debates have been heated and continuous, recently culminating in a broad coalition effort to boycott parliamentary sessions and prevent the legal quorum required to put the amendment to a vote. Widespread resistance to the proposed amendment and polarized opinions across the political spectrum have both revealed and reified the deep divisions that plague our nation.
However, very little has been put forward that situates this development within the context of the Kurdistan Region and examines its potential implications here. It may be tempting to assume that because this framework falls outside the enumerated powers of the federal government, the amended Personal Status Law will have no effect on the Kurdistan Region without formal adoption or ratification by the Kurdistan Parliament, and that we will remain insulated from its most catastrophic impacts. However, this conclusion is short-sighted, as it fails to take into account the tensile web in which the federal and regional governments, and their respective systems, coexist. The ripple effects of this amended framework will inevitably extend across Kurdistan.
The proposed amendment to the Personal Status Law would allow Iraqis to choose to apply a set of codified provisions prepared by religious clerics in the Scientific Councils of the Shia and Sunni Endowments, rather than the unified provisions currently available, in the regulation of personal status matters. In addition to undermining the vision of civil state with equal rights and protections for all, compromising the independence and impartiality of Iraq’s legislative and judicial systems, and eroding the rule of law - all of which have been discussed at length - this change, if enacted, would also create a profound discrepancy between the available mechanisms for regulating personal status matters in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.
Right now, with a few notable exceptions, the Personal Status Law No. 188 of 1959 in Iraq and the applicable Personal Status Law in the Kurdistan Region are largely synergized. To date, this has mitigated the potential for confusion and inconsistency in the implementation of related laws - such as the Nationality Law No. 26 of 2006 and the National Card Law No. 3 of 2016 - which apply to all citizens of Iraq and Kurdistan.
Because the Kurdistan Region is reliant on federal authority in the management of sovereign matters - including the issuance of civil and identity documents, and the registration of marriage and lineage - standardized approaches at the federal and regional levels enhance the prospect of equitable access and treatment across the country. If the amendment is passed, however, those safeguards will be removed, and a set of separate systems will be created. This will introduce procedural differences, complicate enforcement, and may cause individuals to seek preferential treatment or leniency under a specific framework. It could also inhibit the ability of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to address certain personal status matters in accordance with its current applicable law and cause unforeseen complications in bureaucratic processes.
The discrepancy between the two frameworks could prove to be especially problematic in the historically disputed territories, like my hometown of Kirkuk, where governance structures continue to be hotly contested. In some of these areas, constituents might bring their personal status issues before either government’s institutions or administrative offices, impeding a standardized approach to the management of these matters for residents of particular districts and governorates. Additionally, given the high numbers of Kurdish citizens living in the disputed territories who maintain significant ties and relations with residents of the Kurdistan Region, the shifting norms introduced by the amended federal framework could - over time - spread into local customs and eventually become integrated within regional law. The same applies to the large number of Iraqi families from other parts of the country that reside in the Kurdistan Region.
More imminently, however, if the proposed amendment is determined to be in alignment with the precepts of the Iraqi Constitution and passed, then the constitutionality of the Personal Status Law being applied in the Kurdistan Region could be brought into question. This could lead to cases being filed against the Region in the Federal Supreme Court, on the grounds of non-compliance with the constitutional provisions stipulated in Article 41, increasing pressure on the Kurdistan parliament to more closely align its framework with federal law and compromising its authority to legislate matters that fall outside of the enumerated powers of the federal government.
As some aspects of the applicable Personal Status Law in the Kurdistan Region have already come under fire - including provisions that strengthen the rights of women and children, raise the minimum age for marriage, ensure equality in marital contracts, and limit polygamy - this would create an opportunity that can be exploited by special interest groups to erode important social protections for vulnerable communities. This would be an inestimable loss. It is Kurdistan’s leadership and track record on women’s rights which has, historically, set the Region apart and attracted support, partnership, and investment from across the globe. Any encroachment on these rights would represent a profound deviation from a trajectory that has been recognized as exemplary and universally celebrated, and would compromise our credibility and standing within the international community.
It is imperative that stakeholders across the Kurdistan Region take swift, concerted, and collective action to prevent the proposed amendment from moving forward. The risks - not just to Iraq, but to the authority, credibility, and stability of the Kurdistan Region and the protection of all its inhabitants - are simply too great. The time to act is now.
Tanya Gilly Khailany is the vice-president and co-founder of SEED Foundation, a local, women-led NGO in the Kurdistan Region. Previously, she was a member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives from 2006-2010, representing Kirkuk.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
